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ABSTRACT
After fifty years of catching up to the United States level of productivity, since 1995 Europe has been
falling behind. The growth rate in output per hour over 1995-2003 in Europe was just half that in the
United States, and this annual growth shortfall caused the level of European productivity to fall back
from 94 percent of the United States level to 85 percent. Fully one-fifth of the European catch-up (from
44 to 94 percent) over the previous half-century has been lost over the period since 1995.
Disaggregated studies of industrial sectors suggest that the main difference between Europe and the
United States is in ICT-using industries like wholesale and retail trade and in securities trading. The
contrast in retailing calls attention to regulatory barriers and land-use regulations in Europe that inhibit
the development of the big box retailing formats that have created many of the productivity gains in the
United States.  For many decades, the United States and Europe have gone in opposite directions in the
public policies relevant for metropolitan growth. The United States has promoted highly dispersed low-
density metropolitan areas through its policies of building intra-urban highways, starving public transit,
providing tax subsidies to home ownership, and allowing local governments to maintain low density by
maintaining minimum residential lot sizes. Europeans have chosen different policies that encourage high-
density residential living and retail precincts in the central city while inhibiting the exploitation of
greenfield suburban and exurban sites suitable for modern big box retail developments.
The middle part of the paper draws on recent writing by Phelps: economic dynamism is promoted by
policies that promote competition and flexible equity finance and is retarded by corporatist institutions
designed to protect incumbent producers and inhibit new entry. European cultural attributes inhibit the
development of ambition and independence by teenagers and young adults, in contrast to their
encouragement in the United States.  While competition, corporatism, and culture may help to explain
the differing transatlantic evolution of productivity growth, they reveal institutional flaws in both
continents that are inbred and likely to persist.
The final section of the paper identifies the roots of the favorable environment for innovation in the
United States compared to Europe. Elements include an openly competitive system of private and public
universities, government subsidies to universities through peer-reviewed research grants rather than
unconditional subsidies for free undergraduate tuition, the world dominance of United States business
schools and management consulting firms, strong United States patent protection, a flexible financial
infrastructure making available venture capital finance to promising innovations, the benefits of a






and NBERI.  Introduction
After a half century following World War II of catching up to the level of U. S.
productivity, since 1995 Europe has experienced a productivity growth slowdown while
the United States has experienced a marked acceleration.  As a result, just in the past eight
years, Europe has already lost about one-fifth of its previous 1950-95 gain in output per
hour relative to the United States.  Starting from 71 percent of the U. S. level of productivity
in 1870, Europe fell back to 44 percent in 1950, caught up to 94 percent in 1995, and has now
fallen back to 85 percent.  What were the causes of this stunning setback?  
This paper argues that the discussion of policy reform in Europe has been too
narrowly focussed on the deregulation of product and labor markets.  A broader set of
social choices matters for productivity, and some of these differences between the U. S. and
Europe may be irreversible.  Much of the surprising acceleration of U. S. productivity
growth since 1995 originates in the trade sector, particularly retail trade, and goes far
beyond the use of information and communication technology (ICT).  The retail sector in
the U. S. has been revolutionized by the ʺbig boxʺ format epitomized by Wal-Mart, and
perhaps the most important factor of production in making this format possible is a large
plot of virgin land which is much more widely available in the sprawling American
metropolitan areas than in tightly regulated European environment of land-use planning
and protection of old central city retail zones.  The American explosion of productivity
growth in retailing calls attention to basic life-style choices that constitute yet another form
of ʺAmerican Exceptionalism.ʺ  While the American form of metropolitan organization may
promote productivity growth, Europeans are rightly skeptical of unmeasured costs of low
urban density in America as promoted by explicit government policies.  Europeans decry
side-effects of the American system that may promote productivity without creating
consumer welfare, including excess energy use, pollution, and time spent in traffic
congestion.Leaving the Station, Page 2
A second set of major differences originates in what could be called ʺEuropean
exceptionalism.ʺ  As Phelps has argued, European growth is still retarded by corporatist
institutions which are designed to protect incumbent producers and inhibit new entry.
European cultural attitudes inhibit the development of ambition and independence of
teenagers and young adults, who are cradled in subsides such as free tuition for higher
education while American teenagers are expected to get out into the marketplace, work,
and contribute real money to their own college education.  The differing behavior of
productivity growth since 1995 helps to call attention to differences between Europe and
the U. S. which have long been present but seemed unimportant during the five decades
prior to 1995 when Europe was rapidly catching up to the American level of productivity.
A third issue raised by the U. S. post-1995 productivity revival has been an explosion
of innovation in the production and use of ICT.  The past decade has witnessed a growing
concentration of innovative activity in the United States, not only in computer hardware
and software, but also in pharmaceuticals and biotech research.  The sources of this
innovative advantage call attention to European shortcomings that cannot be easily cured
by deregulation.  These include the continuing U. S. advantage of a unified market
unincumbered by differences in customs, language, or electric plugs; the competitive U.
S. system of private and public universities; the system of peer review that guides U. S.
government support of research; well-enforced patent protection; a dynamic capital market
able to fund promising start-ups; and the welcome extended by the United States to foreign
graduate students in all fields and especially to highly skilled immigrant engineers.
It is important at the outset not only to set out the topic issues discussed in this
paper, but also those that are outside its purview.  We have nothing to say here about the
well-trodden issues in the functioning of the European labor market, deregulation of labor
markets past, present, or future, and specific issues involving product market regulations,Leaving the Station, Page 3
     1.  A more balanced view that attempts to quantify an overstatement of U. S. welfare relative to Europe is
provided in Gordon (2002).
e.g. shop-closing hours.  Also, while this paper highlights life-style and cultural differences,
it does not attempt a comprehensive comparison of standards of living, and its several
dimensions of praise for the American system should not be interpreted as an endorsement
for well-known failures such as the lack of universal government-financed health care in
the United States.
1
The paper begins with basic data on productivity growth in Europe and the United
States over selected intervals since 1870 and displays the relative level of European
productivity, falling behind until 1950, catching up until 1995, and then falling behind since
then.  Data on differences at the sectoral level are then displayed, highlighting the role in
the U. S. revival of ICT-using industries, especially retailing.  The paper then continues
with a comparison of the retailing environment in the U. S. vs. Europe, followed by
attention to broader cultural issues.  It concludes with a multi-part comparison of the
stimuli and barriers to technical change and innovation on the two sides of the Atlantic.
II.  Data on Trans-Atlantic Productivity Differences:  Growth Rates and
Levels
The long history of productivity growth and levels is displayed in Table 1.  The data
from 1870 to 1990 come from Maddison (2001) and refer to the total economy, that is, real
GDP per hour.  These data are updated for 1990-2003 with OECD data on the private
economy.  While productivity growth in the private economy is usually slightly faster than
in the total economy, this is true both in the U. S. and in Europe, and so the break in
coverage at 1990 should not affect our main point of concern, that is, transatlanticLeaving the Station, Page 4
     2.  The Maddison data refer to 12 countries weighted by relative GDP; these are the 15 members of the
EU minus Greece, Portugal, and Spain.  The post-1990 OECD data refer to all 15 EU members.  While the
Maddison are available through 1998, he provides no intermediate data between 1990 and 1998, and we
choose 1995 as a preferable break date which highlights the starting point of the transatlantic productivity
growth divergence.
     3.  The less impressive U. S. performance in Table 2 is due to the use by McGuckin and van Ark (2004) of
household employment figures to calculate economy-wide productivity, unlike Table 1 where the OECD
follows U. S. practice by calculating private-sector productivity based on the slower-growing payroll
employment data.  For a discussion of this discrepancy, see Gordon (2003, p. 258-61 and the sources cited
differences in growth rates and their implications for relative levels.
2
The left section of Table 1 shows average annual percentage growth rates of
productivity in the U. S., Europe and the U. S. - Europe difference, for selected intervals
since 1870.  The familiar story is that Europe fell behind from 1870 to 1950, then caught up
after 1950.  Less familiar is the extent to which Europe has fallen behind again after 1995.
As shown in the right section of Table 1, Europe had almost closed the gap in productivity
levels by 1995, but its slow growth since then has caused its relative productivity level to
slip back from 94 to 85 percent, eroding 9 points of its 50 point catch-up between 1950 and
1995.   
A closer look at the divergence is provided by Table 2, which contrasts the 1990-95
period with 1995-2003 and provides a uniform treatment of the total economy based on a
new Conference Board pamphlet by McGuckin-van Ark (2004).  The initial European
slowdown evident in data for 1995-2000 worsened with data for 2000-2003, whereas the U.
S. sustained its productivity growth revival.  We should note that the 1995-2003 difference
between U. S. and European productivity growth is less than in Table 1, and so the extent
of European retrogression depends on whether we use the post-1990 data on the private
economy, as in Table 1, or on the total economy, as in Table 2.  Given the well-known
difficulties in measuring productivity in the government and non-profit sector, we prefer
to emphasize the greater difference shown in Table 1.
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there).
The right-hand column of Table 2 displays the change in output, hours, and output
per hour between 1990-95 and 1995-2003.  The post-1995 acceleration in output growth was
slightly less in Europe than in the U. S., 0.6 vs. 0.9 percentage points, respectively.  Most of
the literature on the failure of Europe to achieve a post-1995 productivity growth
acceleration treats Europe as overregulated and stuck in the mud.  On the contrary
Europeʹs performance in hours of work was the diametric opposite of the U. S., accelerating
by almost two percentage points compared to pre-1995, whereas there was no change in
hours growth in the U. S.  As a result, the productivity change between 1990-95 and 1995-
2003 was the mirror image of the hours change, with an acceleration of almost one percent
per annum for the U. S. and a deceleration of more than one percent for Europe.
Understanding Europe:  Distinguishing the Stars from the Basket Cases
If the decomposition of growth sources is a booming academic industry on the west
side of the Atlantic, laments about Europeʹs performance are the corresponding concern
of academics on the east side of the Atlantic.  While the U. S. enjoyed a productivity growth
revival after 1995, as we have seen in Tables 1 and 2, a growth deceleration occurred in
numerous European countries as well as in the European Union as a whole.  This Europe-
U. S. contrast seems to fly in the face of the widespread evidence (Oliner-Sichel, 2000, 2002;
Jorgenson-Stiroh 2000) that investment in information and communications technology
(ICT) was the basic source of the U. S. achievement.  How could ICT be the main source of
the U. S. growth revival, while Europe fell behind?  Business firms, not to mention
university professors, use the same PCs and Microsoft software everywhere in Europe, and
Europe is widely acknowledged to be ahead in the use of mobile telephones. 
  Part of the European puzzle is resolved when we recognize that heterogeneityLeaving the Station, Page 6
     4.  Scatter plots supporting these correlations between MFP growth and computer intensity are presented
in Bartelsman et al. (2002, Figures 8 and 9).
among European countries is more pronounced than the difference between the European
Union and the U. S.  Numerous studies have shown a relatively strong positive correlation
between MFP growth and measures of ICT use, e.g., the ratio of ICT expenditure to GDP
or the change in PC use per 100 inhabitants over the 1990s.  In such comparisons, numerous
countries achieve higher MFP growth rates than the U. S. over the 1990s, including Ireland,
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and Australia.  Some, but not all, of these
countries surpass the U. S. in PC use per household and/or in the share of ICT expenditure.
What differs most between Europe and the U. S. is the low level of PC adoption and ICT
expenditure in the ʺolive beltʺ ranging from Portugal and Spain on the west to Italy and
Greece in the east.
4  The contrast between the Nordic and olive-belt countries suggests
irreverent comments about how Scandinavians in their dark winters find PCs more
appealing than do olive-belt residents cavorting on their sunny beaches.   
Contrasts within Europe also suggest that perhaps we could try to disaggregate  the
U. S. to provide a more appropriate comparison with Europe.  Silicon Valley could be
compared to Ireland and Finland, New England could be compared to Denmark and
Sweden, Texas to Australia, and the midwestern heartland to France and Germany.  What
stands out in this suggestion is the absence of any U. S. equivalent for the European olive-
belt countries.  Political borders are a product of history, and perhaps the U. S. would look
more like Europe, which includes the olive belt,  if we were to aggregate U. S. data with
those for the tequila belt, i.e., Mexico.
The Industry Decomposition of the Europe-U. S. Difference
A comprehensive recent study by OʹMahoney and van Ark (2003) provides a few
answers at a more formal level.  As shown in Table 3, they support the widespreadLeaving the Station, Page 7
impression that America accelerated while Europe fell behind.  The top line in Table 3
shows that U. S. productivity growth accelerated by 1.1 percent in the late 1990s while
European growth decelerated by 0.6 percent.  An initial caveat is that Europe looks much
better when the entire decade of the 1990s is aggregated into a single 1990-2001 period;
European productivity growth averages out to 2.0 percent per year, considerably higher
than U. S. growth of 1.6 percent per year.  It is important to remember the different
terminal dates in Tables 1 and 2 vs. Table 3.  The first two tables end in 2003 and
incorporate explosive U. S. productivity growth in 2001-03, whereas Table 3 ends in 2001
and is influenced by slow U. S. growth during its 2001 recession.
The OʹMahoney and van Ark study allows us to trace the location of productivity
growth accelerations and decelerations to particular industrial sectors, divided into ICT-
producing, ICT-using, and non-ICT industries.  There has been no productivity revival in
U. S. industries that are classified as neither ICT-producing nor ICT-using, and this is
confirmed on the bottom line of Table 3 for the U. S.  These industries are also the core of
the European problem, exhibiting a deceleration in the late 1990s slightly greater than for
the European economy as a whole.  In ICT-producing industries there was an acceleration
after 1995 of 1.9 percent per year in the U. S. and a similar 1.6 percent per year in Europe,
but the U. S. started from a higher base.   The core of the U. S. success story, and the source
of its difference from Europe, appears to have been in ICT-using industries, i.e., retail,
wholesale, and securities trading industries.  
A separate analysis by van Ark et al. (2003, Figure 2a) shows that literally all of the
productivity growth differential of the U. S. over Europe in the late 1990s came from these
three industries, with retail contributing about 55 percent of the differential, wholesale 24
percent, and securities trade 20 percent.  The remaining industries had small positive or
negative differentials, netting out to zero.  As might have been expected, the U. S.-EuropeLeaving the Station, Page 8
differential was negative in telecom services, reflecting U. S. backwardness in mobile
phones.
III.  The Retailing Phenomenon
We know that U. S. productivity growth accelerated after 1995, and we can speculate
about the aspects of ICT innovation that helped this acceleration to occur.  But the
simultaneous acceleration in productivity growth and in ICT investment as a share of GDP
amounts, at least in part, to circumstantial evidence.  Questions can be raised about the link
between ICT innovation and the productivity revival, given evidence of a further
acceleration of productivity growth in the years after 2000, a period when ICT investment
collapsed.   Other aspects of innovation beyond ICT may be as important as ICT in
explaining the outstanding productivity performance since 1995 of the U. S. retail trade
sector.      
This performance did not occur evenly across the board in retailing but rather was
concentrated in ʺlarge stores offering a wide array of goods accompanied by low prices and
relatively high use of self-service systemsʺ (Sieling et al. 2001, p. 10).  A complementary
finding by Foster et al. (2002) based on a study of a large set of individual retail
establishments shows that all of retail productivity growth (not just the revival but the
entire measured amount of productivity growth over the decade of the 1990s) can beLeaving the Station, Page 9
     5.  A concise summary of the Oliner-Sichel findings for 1973-95 contrasted with both 1995-99 and 1995-
2002 appears in Gordon (2003, Table 10, p. 252).
attributed to more productive entering establishments which displaced much less
productive existing establishments.  The average establishment that continued in business
exhibited zero productivity growth, and this despite the massive investment of the retail
industry in ICT equipment that presumably went to both old and new establishments.  
In the Foster results, productivity growth reflects the greater efficiency of newly opened
stores, and the Sieling comment implies that most of these highly efficient new stores were
large discount operations, the proverbial ʺbig boxesʺ like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Best Buy,
Circuit City, and new large supermarkets.  
The Sieling and Foster findings seem to conflict with the Oliner-Sichel (2000, 2002)
finding that, at least for the period through 1999, all of the productivity revival in retailing
was achieved by purchasing new computers, software, and communications equipment.
5
All retailers, whether new estabilishments of the 1990s or older establishments of the 1980s
or prior decades, have adopted ICT technology.  Bar-code readers have become universal
in new and old stores.  It is likely that the productivity revival in retailing associated with
newly built ʺbig boxʺ stores involves something beyond the use of computers, including
large size, economies of scale, efficient design to allow large-volume unloading from
delivery trucks, stacking of merchandise on tall racks with fork-lift trucks, and large-scaleLeaving the Station, Page 10
     6.  Any generalizations here about "Europe" must be qualified by differences across countries.  The
Germans until recently were notorious for restrictive shop-closing hours, while the French firm Carrefour
and the Swedish firm Ikea are innovators in "big box" retailing formats. 
purchases taken by customers to vehicles in adjacent parking lots.  
As we have seen, the van Ark et al. (2002) results identify the retail sector as a major
factor explaining Europeʹs poor performance in the late 1990s.  Just as the U. S. retailing
sector has achieved efficiency gains for reasons not directly related to computers, including
physical investments in a new type of ʺbig boxʺ organization, so we can suggest in parallel
that Europe has fallen back because European firms are much less free to develop the ʺbig
boxʺ retail formats.
6  Impediments include land use regulations that prevent the carving
out of new ʺgreenfieldʺ sites for ʺbig boxʺ stores in suburban and exurban locations, shop-
closing regulations that restrict the revenue potential of new investments, congestion in
central-city locations that are near the nodes of Europeʹs extensive urban public transit
systems, and restrictive labor rules that limit flexibility in organizing the workplace and
make it expensive to hire and fire workers with the near-total freedom to which U. S. firms
are accustomed.
A complementary interpretation is provided in a cross-country study of productivity
differences in the service sector by the McKinsey Global Institute (1992).  Their set of policy
recommendations (Chapter 2-D, pp. 13-14) seem as relevant today as when written a
decade ago and echo the previous paragraph by pointing to impediments to theLeaving the Station, Page 11
development of modern retailing in some but not all European countries.  European
policymakers have adopted a set of policies that encourage high density and a
concentration of retailing activity in the central city.  The development of modern ʺbig boxʺ
retailing formats has been hindered by these policies and the resulting high cost of real
estate and the complex and precarious process of obtaining planning approval for large
plots of land.  
An issue identified by McKinsey is the role of resale price maintenance policies that
in the U. S. assure new competitors that they will be able to attain the same access to
suppliers at roughly the same prices as existing retailers.  In contrast, in some European
countries producers refuse to discount to new, high-volume, low-cost retailing formats in
order to protect smaller high-cost merchants.   In some European countries, regulations
directly prohibit the entry of large-scale stores and/or limit store opening days and hours,
thus preventing large stores from fully amortizing their investments.  
A partial survey of other cross-country studies reveals a disappointing lack of
specific conclusions at the level of the van Ark et al. and McKinsey studies.  The typical
study conducts a growth accounting exercise, concludes that Europe has lagged behind the
U. S. in adopting ICT technology to a greater or lesser degree, does not trace differences in
behavior to specific industries, and concludes with a general plea for unspecified structural
reforms.  Among the studies that fit this characterization are Colecchia and Schreyer (2001),Leaving the Station, Page 12
Daveri (2002), Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (2002), and Vijselaar and
Albers (2002).
A final caution is in order.  The superior performance of U. S. retailing in achieving
rapid productivity growth may in part be due to a measurement procedure that allows
quality improvements in manufacturing to spill over to the retail sector.  Imagine a 2003
computer sold at the same price as a 1993 computer but containing four times the ʺquality,ʺ
measured by a hedonic price regression that includes the computerʹs speed, memory, and
additional attributes (presence of CD-DVD read-write capability, presence of USB ports,
better speakers, etc).  Then the 2003 computer represents four times the real output of the
manufacturing sector and four times the real sales of the retail sector.  If all that the
retailing sector sold was computers, and if computer boxes sold per retail employee were
constant, the U. S. methodology would register an annual productivity growth rate for
retailing of 13.9 percent per year.  While there has been substantial discussion of the role
of hedonic price indexes in improving the measured productivity performance of the U.
S. manufacturing sector, I am unaware of any similar comments about the potential for
noncomparability in retailing productivity.
IV.  Economic Institutions and Culture
A refreshing contrast is provided by Phelps (2003), who takes a broader view ofLeaving the Station, Page 13
economic institutions that promote economic ʺdynamismʺ and those that suppress it.  His
analysis of ʺdynamismʺ starts from Schumpeterʹs concept of ʺcreative destructionʺ.  He
adds to Schumpeterʹs emphasis on entrepreneurship an equal if not greater emphasis on
ʺfinanciership,ʺ that is, the ability of financial markets to steer finance to worthy
innovations.  The greater success of the U. S. in encouraging innovation is attributed in part
to its greater emphasis on venture capital and initial public equity offerings (IPO) than in
Europe.
Europe:  Corporatism and Spoiled Youth  
In Phelpsʹ view, the relatively poor economic performance of continental Europe
results both from the underdevelopment of capitalist institutions like venture capital and
equity finance, and the overdevelopment on corporatist institutions which suppress
innovation and competition.  These corporatist institutions impose ʺpenalties,
impediments, prohibitions, and mandates . . . generally intended to damp down creative
destruction.ʺ  Among these impediments are licenses and permissions to set up a new plant
or firm, the need to consult with workers on changes in the mix of products or plants, and
employment protection legislation.  Because these institutions are designed to suppress the
changes inherent in ʺunbridled capitalism,ʺ they also lead to the underdevelopment of the
stock market, resulting in lower ratios of stock market valuation to GDP in continental
Europe than in the U. S. and other less corporatist economies like Britain, Canada, andLeaving the Station, Page 14
Australia.   Phelps provides a complementary analysis of cultural differences between
Europe and the U. S.  Europeans view with disdain the money-grubbing Americans with
their out-sized rewards for CEOs and successful entrepreneurs.  American children begin
to work earlier than European children, earning baby-sitting money in their early teens,
working in fast-food outlets while in high school, and are forced to work during college in
contrast to European youth who ʺfree rideʺ on government-paid college tuition and
stipends.  Phelps concludes that Europe has developed a culture of ʺdependencyʺ that
ʺbreeds an unduly large share of young people who have little sense of independence and
are unwilling to strike out on their own.ʺ  He might have added that high levels of long-
term youth unemployment discourage independence and encourage young adults to live
with their parents in their 20s and, in Italy, into their 30s.
Caveats
Europeans do not take these criticisms lying down.  Yes, they admit that high youth
unemployment, low labor force participation, and a generation of young adults living with
their parents represent an economic and social failure.  But they are quick to criticize
aspects of American economic and political institutions that, while making it easy for Wal-
Mart and Home Depot to find the land to build thousands of ʺbig boxʺ stores, has offsetting
disadvantages.  
Europeans find abhorrent the hundreds of billions, or even trillions, that AmericansLeaving the Station, Page 15
have spent on extra highways and extra energy to support the dispersion of the population
into huge metropolitan areas spreading over hundreds or even thousands of square miles,
in many cases with few transport options other than the automobile.  Productivity data do
not give Europe sufficient credit for the convenience benefits of frequent bus, subway, and
train (including TGV) public transit.  Excessive American dispersion is viewed as a
response to misguided public policies, especially subsidies to interstate highways in vast
amounts relative to public transport, local zoning measures in some suburbs that prohibit
residential land allocations below a fixed size, e.g., two acres, and the infamous and
politically untouchable deduction of mortgage interest payments from income tax.  
Europeans enjoy shopping at small individually owned shops on lively central city
main streets and pedestrian arcades, and recoil with distaste from the ubiquitous and
cheerless American strip malls and big-box retailers — although Carrefour, Ikea, and
others provide American-like options in some European cities.  To counter the effects of
American land use regulations that create overly dispersed metropolitan areas, Europeans
counter with their own brand of land use rules that preserve greenbelts and inhibit growth
of suburban and exurban retailing.  A more complete consideration of these differences
leads to the conclusion that GDP data understate the Europe/U. S. ratio of both
productivity and real GDP per capita (see Gordon, 2002).
    Leaving the Station, Page 16
V.  Incentives for Innovation in the U. S. and Europe
Thus far we have concluded that ICT investment has been exaggerated as the sole
source of the U. S. productivity revival of the late 1990s, and it is even more clear that lack
of ICT investment has been wrongly cited as the main source of the contrasting
productivity performance in Europe.  The main U. S. advantage was in retail and wholesale
trade, where the expansion of new establishments raised productivity growth for many
reasons going well beyond ICT investment, and the ability of Europe to expand in tandem
was hampered by regulations and institutions that have long been cited as a drag on
European economic growth.
Albeit narrowly based in computer hardware, at least in the official statistics, the
apparent ʺruptureʺ or discontinuity in the rate of technical change in the mid-1990s forces
to inquire as to its sources and lessons for understanding the economic history of the U. S.
and other nations.  America is now almost universally believed to have surged to the
forefront in most of the ICT industries.  But our overview of the stimuli and barriers to
technological change and innovation focusses not just on computer hardware more broadly
on software, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and biotech.  Why did the U. S. have
a comparative or absolute advantage in innovative capacity in the late 1990s, more than a
century after its initial leadership in the invention of electricity and its early lead in theLeaving the Station, Page 17
     7.  Most notably Edward Yardeni, now the Chief Economist of Prudential Securities, who early in the
1990s predicted both the stock market boom and the revival of productivity growth.
exploitation of the internal combustion engine?  
National Technological Leadership:  General Considerations
The mid-1990s discontinuity of technical change in the United States was not
predicted in advance, although its significance was spotted almost immediately by Business
Week and some other astute observers.
7  A decade earlier it had been ʺJapan as Number
Oneʺ, and briefly the market value of Japanese equities exceeded that of American equities.
Rosenberg (1986, p. 25) perceptively generalizes about the difficulty of forecasting the
consequences of inventions in advance:  ʺA disinterested observer who happened to be
passing by at Kitty Hawk on that fateful day in 1903 might surely be excused if he did not
walk away with visions of 747s or C-5As in his head.ʺ   The great success of Japanese firms
in dominating many leading technologies in the 1980s did not appear to give them any
head start in dominating the new technologies of the 1990s.  Rosenberg points to the failure
of carriage makers to play any role in the development of the automobile, or even the
failure of steam locomotive makers to participate in the development of the diesel
locomotive.  Thus it is perhaps not surprising that Japanese electronics companies did not
participate to any great extent in the particular interplay of chip-making technology and
software development that created the Internet and the post-1995 technical acceleration inLeaving the Station, Page 18
     8.  An explicit analysis of the effect of complementary inventions on the consumer surplus of the initial
invention is provided by Bresnahan and Gordon (1997, pp. 7-11).
computer hardware, although the Japanese more recently have been leaders in the
development of mobile phones with cameras and internet capability.  
Many inventions initially created to solve a narrow problem (for instance, the steam
engine was initially invented to pump water out of flooded mines) turned out to have
widespread further uses that were not initially foreseen.  Major inventions spawn
numerous complementary developments; while the initial motivation for the internal
combustion engine was to improve the performance-to-weight ratio of the steam engine,
it made possible not only motor transport and air transport, but such complementary
developments as the suburb, supermarket, superhighway, and the tropical vacation
industry.  In turn, the complementary inventions raise the consumer surplus associated
with the invention, and this may continue for a long time.  The invention of the Internet is
just one of many byproducts of the invention of electricity that raise the consumer surplus
of that initial major invention.
8
The literature on technology distinguishes between the initial invention and its
subsequent development and diffusion.  A longstanding puzzle in the retardation of British
economic growth after the 1870s is the fact that many inventions initially made by British
inventors were brought to commercial success in the U. S., Japan, and elsewhere.  ThisLeaving the Station, Page 19
     9.  The generalizations in the next several paragraphs select among the more important points made by
Mowery and Nelson (1999a).
issue of who captures the fruits of innovation suggests that the British were not alone in
losing out.  The U. S. invention of videotape was followed by exploitation of the consumer
VCR market that was almost entirely achieved by Japanese companies.  The Finnish
company Nokia took over leadership in mobile phones from Motorola.  Within any
economy there are winners and losers as upstart companies (Intel, Microsoft) seize the
advantage in developing technology while leaving older competitors (IBM, Wang, Digital
Equipment, Xerox) behind.  
While predicting technological developments in advance is exceedingly difficult,
there is an ample literature which points to particular national characteristics that help to
explain, at least in retrospect, why particular inventions and industries came to be
dominated by particular countries.
9  Perhaps the one generalization that spans most
industries is the role of the product cycle.  No matter what the causes of initial national
leadership, technology eventually diffuses from the leading nations to other nations that
may have lower labor costs.  It is beyond the scope of this discussion to explain why some
nations, e.g., Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, seem to have done so much better than other
nations, e.g., Brazil or Bangladesh, in combining technological duplication with an
advantage, at least initially, in labor costs, in industries ranging from automobiles to chip,Leaving the Station, Page 20
computer, and disk-drive manufacturing.
The Traditional Sources of U. S. Advantage.  
According to the standard data compiled by Maddison and others, summarized for
Europe (but not individual countries) in Table 1 above, the level of output per hour in the
United States moved ahead of that in the United Kingdom in the late nineteenth century
and has remained in first place among the major developed nations ever since.  An
extensive literature on the sources of U. S. superiority (e.g., Wright, 1990) identifies national
advantages both in the supply of resources and in national characteristics of demand.  The
U. S. achieved initial leadership in petrochemicals in part because of its abundant supply
of cheap domestic petroleum, while its leadership in machine tools was the result of its
early adoption of mass production methods, which in turn reflected its relative scarcity of
labor and its large internal market.  In turn mass production, together with long distances,
cheap land, and the low density of urban development help to explain why the U. S.
achieved such an enormous early lead in automobile production and ownership in the
1920s.  In turn the mass market for automobiles fed back into a rapidly increasing demand
for gasoline and stimulated further developments in petroleum and petrochemical
manufacturing.  The enormous American lead in its 1929 capacity to manufacture engines
for motor vehicles, with perhaps 80 percent of worldwide capacity, contributed the core
of the astounding production achievement of the 1942-45 ʺArsenal of Democracy.ʺ    Leaving the Station, Page 21
However, it is less clear that Americaʹs large domestic market provided a universal
source of advantage throughout the history of technological development over the last two
centuries.  Between 1870 and 1914 flows of goods, capital, and immigrants were notably
free, and trade could create international markets on the scale of the U. S. domestic
markets, as demonstrated by German dominance in chemicals.  After 1960 Japan rose to
prominence and even domination in one industry after another, with export markets
providing the scale that was lacking, at least initially, at home.  Several small countries, e.g.,
the Netherlands and Sweden, have remained close to the productivity frontier over the past
century despite their small relative size.  
Educational Attainment and University Research. 
Close integration of industrial R&D and university research is credited with German
domination of the chemical products industry between the 1870s and early 1920s, as well
as German and Swiss leadership in the development of pharmaceuticals in the early part
of the 20th century.  More generally, a rise in educational attainment is one of the sources
of rising output per hour.  While the first cited role of the education system in technological
development is the rise of the German chemical industry after 1870, a set of relatively
uncoordinated policies at the state and local level resulted in the U. S. achieving the first
universal secondary education between 1910 and 1940 (Goldin, 1998) and the highest rate
of participation in college education after World War II.  Leaving the Station, Page 22
Even in the dismal days of American pessimism during the years of the 1972-95
productivity slowdown, it was widely recognized that Americaʹs private and state-
supported research universities were its most successful export industry, at least as
measured by its lead over other countries and its appeal for students from the rest of the
world.  The interplay among these research universities, government research grants, and
private industry was instrumental in achieving American leadership in the IT industry, and
it was no coincidence that Silicon Valley happened to be located next to Stanford University
or that another concentration of IT companies in the hardware, software, and biotech
industries was located in the Boston area near M.I.T. and Harvard.
A U. S. educational advantage of possible importance is its early development of the
graduate school of business and its continuing near-monopoly in this type of education.
The mere existence of business schools did not provide any solution to the productivity
slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s, and indeed the ongoing superiority of Japanese firms
in automobiles and consumer electronics elicited the cynical joke in those years that ʺthe
secret advantage of the Japanese manufacturers is that they have no world-class business
schools.ʺ  While U. S. business schools were indeed weak in teaching such specialities as
manufacturing production and quality control, they excelled in finance and general
management strategy.  These skills came into their own in the 1990s and interacted with
the rise of the venture capital industry and internet start-up companies; in the United StatesLeaving the Station, Page 23
more than elsewhere there was a ready supply of thousands of well-educated MBAs, both
knowledgeable about finance and receptive to a culture of innovation and risk-taking.
Further, U. S. business schools have provided a wealth of talent to further develop U. S.
worldwide dominance in investment banking, accounting, and management-consulting
firms.
Government-funded Military and Civilian Research.
Ironically for a country that has been suspicious of government involvement, it is
the United States that appears to demonstrate the closest links between government policy
and technological leadership.  The central role of government subsidies in achieving
economic growth in the United States go back to the last half of the nineteenth century,
when free farmland under the Homestead Act encouraged immigration and the settlement
of the frontier, while land grants to railroads promoted the building of infrastructure.
Efficiency in the development of Americaʹs endowment of land and raw materials was
fostered by agricultural experiment and research stations and by schools of mining
established as part of Americaʹs then-new network of state universities and colleges
(Wright, 1990).  In the modern era research support from the National Institutes of Health
and National Science Foundation are credited with postwar American leadership in
pharmaceuticals and biomedical research, as well as basic research in the sciences.
Defense-funded research and government-funded grants is credited with the earlyLeaving the Station, Page 24
emergence of American leadership in semiconductors, computers, software, biotech, and
the Internet itself.  Government antitrust policy is credited with the emergence of a
software industry largely independent of computer hardware manufacturers.  
There are notable differences between the U. S. method of supporting higher
education and research and that found in European countries like France, Germany, and
the U. K.  First, the U. S. mix of private universities and those financed at the state and local
level promotes competition and allows the top tier of the private university sector the
budgetary freedom to pay high salaries, fund opulent research labs, and achieve the
highest levels of quality, in turn attracting many top faculty members and graduate
students from other countries.  Second, much of U. S. central government research support
is allocated through a peer-review system that favors a meritocracy of young, active
researchers and discourages elitism and continuing support for senior professors whose
best ideas are in the past.  In Europe a much larger share of central government support
to universities and research institutes goes to general budgetary support that tends to result
in a more equal salary structure less prone to reward academic ʺstarsʺ and also relies less
on the periodic quality hurdle imposed by peer review.  This set of differences is in
addition to specific national shortcomings, e.g., the hierarchical dominance of senior
research professors in Germany.  
Other Government Policies.  Leaving the Station, Page 25
Explicit government policies to encourage the development of specific industries by
trade protection and financial subsidies may have been successful in helping to accelerate
the rise of Japan and Korea to industrial success, but they have been less successful in the
United States and Europe and indeed may have backfired in Japan in the past decade.  The
relevance of particular government policies, from protection to defense spending to
antitrust, differs sufficiently across industries as to discourage generalizations.  In the
industries that have received the most credit for the post-1995 productivity revival  —
semiconductors, computer hardware, and computer software  —  the most important
aspect of public policy appears to have been the relatively unfocussed support of research
and training by the U. S. government.  The literature on the American resurgence in
semiconductor production as well as its continuing dominance in software also emphasizes
the role of private enforcement of intellectual property rights and regulation of licensing
agreements (see Bresnahan and Melerba, 1999, and Mowery, 1999).  The U. S.
pharmaceutical industry initially gained an advantage through massive government
support during World War II, health-related research support during most of the postwar
period, and a long tradition of strong U. S. patent protection  — patent protection was also
strong in parts of Europe, but not in Italy and also not in Japan.   U. S. drug companies also
were able to make high profits, much of which was reinvested in R&D, as a result of high
rents earned in the face of a fragmented health care system with no attempt by theLeaving the Station, Page 26
government to place price or profit ceilings on drug companies  (see Pisano 2002).
Another set of U. S. policies could be interpreted as ʺenforcement of benign neglect.ʺ
The U. S. government took no action to arrest the erosion of state sales tax revenues as
internet e-commerce merchants sold items without charging any sales tax to customers.
In effect, the freedom of e-commerce transactions from the burden of sales taxes amounted
to government subsidization of shipping charges, since for e-commerce these usually
amounted to roughly the same surcharge on listed prices as sales taxes at traditional bricks
and mortar outlets.  The U. S. government also maintained a zero-tariff regime for trade
in electronic components, fostering large trade flows in both directions and a large U. S.
trade deficit in IT manufacturing.  
Capital Markets
In the 1980s American capital markets seemed to be a source of American industrial
weakness, with their emphasis on short-run profit maximization, and there was much envy
of the access of Japanese firms to low-cost bank capital that played a role in the temporary
period of Japanese domination of the semiconductor industry.  But the American capital
market turned out to be a blessing in disguise.  A long tradition of government securities
regulation that forced public disclosure and information and of access of equity research
analysts to internal company information had fostered a large and active market for public
offerings, and this together with the relatively recent emergence of the venture capitalLeaving the Station, Page 27
     10.  As usual there are interconnections between the various sources of American advantage.  For
instance, the best U. S. private universities have been a critical source of U. S. technological leadership and
their wealth and power has been further augmented by their recent investments in U. S. venture capital firms. 
For instance in 1999 Harvard made roughly a 150 percent return on its venture capital investments and a
return of over 40 percent on its entire endowment which now totals almost $20 billion.
industry provided ample finance for start-up companies once the technological
groundwork for the Internet was laid in the mid-1990s.
10  Lerner (2002) identifies a critical
policy change as fostering the relatively recent rise of the U. S. venture capital industry,
namely a ruling that allowed pension funds to invest in venture capital firms.  While the
stock market collapse in 2000-02 brought the venture capital industry down with it, the
financial infrastructure is still there seeking out the next round of innovation.  Only a small
part of this endowment of innovation-seeking financial specialists was lost during the 2000-
02 stock market decline.  Further, the next wave of equity financing will take place in an
environment in which accounting scandals have been discovered, perpetrators have been
tried and jailed, and public confidence in the integrity of financial statements has been
substantially increased.
Language and Immigration  
The literature on technological leadership omits two sources of American advantage
that are surely not insignificant.  While language has little to do with domination in
computer hardware (where indeed many of the components are imported), it is surely
important for the American software industry that English long ago became the worldʹsLeaving the Station, Page 28
leading second language in addition to being spoken as a first language by a critical mass
of the worldʹs educated population.  Another oft-neglected factor that should be discussed
more often is the longstanding openness of the United States to immigration and the role
of immigrants from India, East Asia, and elsewhere in providing the skilled labor that has
been essential to the rise of Silicon Valley.  Likewise, Indians returning from Silicon Valley
have taken the lead in developing Indiaʹs capabilities in programming and call centers that
have fueled the current American debate about the potential harm or benefit of
ʺoutsourcing.ʺ
Another aspect of American advantage and disadvantage is also perhaps too little
discussed.  The technology literature summarized above places heavy emphasis on the
unique role of American research universities in providing a competitive atmosphere
geared to the attraction of the best faculty performing the best research.  Yet every year
another set of test results is announced in which Americans score far down the league
tables in math and science when compared to numerous countries in Europe and Asia.
Those who wring their hands about the state of American elementary and secondary
education might better spend their energies lobbying Congress to increase the immigration
quotas for highly educated individuals with skills in those areas where some Americans
are weak, especially science and engineering.  And those who would argue that loosening
of high-skilled quotas should occur at the cost of a reduction in low-skilled quotas areLeaving the Station, Page 29
     11.  A detailed critique of the current immigration assumptions of the U. S. social security trustees is
contained in Gordon (2003, pp. 264-9).
urged to consider the many benefits of immigration in general, including the provision of
new workers to ease the strain of overly tight labor markets, the revitalization of many
central cities, and the postponement forever of any so-called Social Security ʺcrisis.ʺ
11 
Comparisons with Other Countries
In most comparisons among the leading industrialized nations Britain (and
sometimes Canada) occupy a central ground between the extremes of American
exceptionalism and the opposite tendencies of the continental Europeans and Japanese,
whether concerning the level of unemployment, employment protection or the lack thereof,
the degree of inequality, and the extent of government spending.  Yet in comparing the
extent of American technological leadership with other countries, the story is not one of
extremes, and the balance of advantage varies widely by industry.
Americans dominate most strongly in microprocessors and in computer software.
As documented by Langlois (2002), the extent of Intelʹs domination of the worldwide
market for microprocessors is perhaps unprecedented in industrial history, and the same
could be said for Microsoft.  However, the U. S. advantage in computer hardware is
qualified by the role of Asian countries in providing components like memory chips, hard
drives, and laptop screens.  In fact the United States runs a large trade deficit in computerLeaving the Station, Page 30
     12.  A meeting of the Governors for Health Care at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
on January 22, 2004, centered on the current "brain drain" of pharmaceutical research from Europe to the
U. S. 
hardware and peripherals, both because of component imports from Asia and because a
substantial share of production by American companies like Intel and Dell takes place not
just at home but also in foreign countries like Malaysia and Ireland.  In mobile telephones
the U. S. has been handicapped by regulation that favored too much competition and
allowed multiple standards, thus allowing the dominant producers of GSM equipment and
infrastructure (Nokia and Ericsson) to run away with the worldwide mobile phone market.
The American pharmaceutical industry also faces strong competition from British, German,
and Swiss firms, although recent evidence suggests that key research labs are moving from
Europe to Boston, the Bay Area, and other U. S. research centers.
12    
Several sources of systemic U. S. advantage stand out, most notably the mixed
system of government- and private-funded research universities, the large role of U. S.
government agencies providing research funding based on a criterion of peer review, and
the strong position in a worldwide perspective of U. S. business schools and U. S.-owned
investment banking, accounting, and management-consulting firms.  By comparison
Germany seems particularly weak in its failure to reform its old-fashioned hierarchical
university system, its bureaucratic rules that inhibit start-up firms, its reliance on bank debt
finance, and its weakness in venture capital and equity finance (Siebert and Stolpe, 2002).Leaving the Station, Page 31
France suffers from overcentralized government control, a system of universities and
research institutions which places more emphasis on rewarding those with an elite
educational pedigree rather than those currently working  on the research frontier, and a
culture (with its frequent strikes by farmers and government workers) which is relatively
hostile to innovation and change (see Messerlin, 2002).    
Until its structural reforms and privatizations of the 1980s and 1990s, Britain shared
with France and Germany a labor market dominated by strong unions.  While the strong
unions are gone, Britain continues to suffer from handicaps that date back a century or
more, including a shortfall of technical skills among manual workers and a lack of graduate
management training and business-oriented culture among highly educated workers.
Where Britain does well, as in investment banking or as a destination of inward foreign
investment, it relies on a relatively narrow set of advantages, including the traditional role
of the City of London as a financial center, and the same advantage that the English
language provides, i.e., as a comfortable place for Asian firms to build plants, to the United
States, Canada, Ireland, Australia, and other parts of the former British Empire.  
VI.  Conclusion
After fifty years of catching up to the U. S. level of productivity, since 1995 Europe
has been falling behind.  The growth rate in output per hour over 1995-2003 in Europe wasLeaving the Station, Page 32
just half that in the United States, and this annual growth shortfall caused the level of
European productivity to fall back from 94 percent of the U. S. level to 85 percent (Table
1 above).  Fully one-fifth of the European catch-up (from 44 to 94 percent) over the
previous half-century has been lost over the period since 1995.
Since Europe uses the same computer hardware and software as the U. S., the
impediments to European growth must lie elsewhere than inadequate investment in ICT.
The new upsurge of U. S. productivity growth during 2000-03, a period when ICT
investment slumped, also suggests that ICT investment has previously been given too
much credit for the U. S. productivity achievement, and insufficient attention has been
directed to other contributing factors.  References to ʺEuropeʺ disguise a wide variety of
performance, with Ireland and Finland exhibiting much faster productivity growth than
the U. S., but ʺolive beltʺ nations like Italy and Greece scoring low on productivity and ICT
investment (except for mobile phones).  Disaggregated studies of industrial sectors suggest
that the main difference between Europe and the U. S. is in ICT-using industries like
wholesale and retail trade and in securities trading.  The contrast in retailing calls attention
to regulatory barriers and land-use regulations in Europe that inhibit the development of
the ʺbig boxʺ retailing formats that have created many of the productivity gains in the U. S.
For many decades, the U. S. and Europe have gone in opposite directions in the
public policies relevant for metropolitan growth.  The U. S. has promoted highly dispersedLeaving the Station, Page 33
low-density metropolitan areas through its policies of building intra-urban highways,
starving public transit, tax subsidies to home ownership, and allowing local governments
to maintain low density by maintaining minimum residential lot sizes.  Europeans have
chosen different policies, including public transit subsidies that seem lavish by American
standards, with less generous tax subsidies to home ownership and land use policies which
encourage high-density residential living and retail precincts in the central city while
inhibiting the exploitation of ʺgreenfieldʺ suburban and exurban sites suitable for modern
ʺbig boxʺ retail developments.
Phelps provides a unifying framework in which economic dynamism is promoted
by policies that promote competition and flexible equity finance and is retarded by
corporatist institutions which are designed to protect incumbent producers and inhibit new
entry.  He also points to European cultural attributes that inhibit the development of
ambition and independence by teenagers and young adults, in contrast to their
encouragement in the U. S.  While competition, corporatism, and culture may help to
explain the differing evolution of productivity growth on the two sides of the Atlantic since
1995, they reveal institutional flaws in both continents that are inbred and likely to persist.
The outstanding performance of American productivity growth since 1995 raises the
danger of a resurgent American triumphalism, perhaps symbolized by an imaginary ArcLeaving the Station, Page 34
     13.  See Consumer Reports, April, 2004, and the latest J. D. Powers initial quality rankings.
de Triomphe erected over Sand Hill Road at the border between Palo Alto and Menlo Park,
CA, the heart of Silicon Valley.  No doubt the growing American dominance of innovation
in ICT, biotech, and pharmaceuticals reflects in part the fruitful collaboration of
government research funding, world-leading private universities, innovative private firms,
and a dynamic capital market.  However, we should be cautious.  The favorable
preconditions that fostered innovation after 1995 did not prevent the U. S. from
experiencing the dismal 1972-95 years of the productivity growth slowdown and near-
stagnation of real wages, and they do not give the U. S. an advantage in many other
industries.  A quarter century after the invasion of Japanese auto imports, the quality
rankings of automobiles still are characterized by a bimodal distribution in which Japanese
nameplates (even those manufactured in the U. S.) dominate the highest rankings and
American nameplates dominate the lowest.
13  Th e U.  S.  sh o ws n o  si g n  o f r eg a i n i n g
leadership in the manufacturing of computer peripherals or machine tools.  The U. S.
innovation infrastructure remains fertile soil when the right seeds are planted, as after 1995,
but fertile soil without the right seeds can lie fallow for decades.Leaving the Station, Page 35
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Growth Rate and Level of GDP per Hour Worked,
U. S. vs. Europe, 1870-2003
Annual Average Growth Rate Europe Level, U. S. =100
U. S. - Europe /
U. S. Europe Europe U. S.  
1870 71
1870-1913 1.92 1.55 0.37 1913 61
1913-1950 2.48 1.56 0.92 1950 44
1950-1973 2.77 4.77 -2.00 1973 79
1973-1995 1.48 2.25 -0.77 1995 94
1995-2003 2.33 1.15 1.18 2003 85
Source:  1870-1990, Maddison (2001, Tables E-8 and E-9, pp. 352-3)
              1990-2003, OECD Economic Outlook, December 2003, Table 13TABLE 2
Annual Rate of Change of Output, Hours, and Output per Hour,
U. S. vs. Europe, 1990-2003
  1995-2003 
1990-95 1995-2000 2000-03 1995-2003 vs. 1990-95
United States         
   Output 2.4 4.1 2.0 3.3 0.9
   Hours 1.4 2.2 0.1 1.4 0.0
   Output per Hour 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.9
 
European Union   
   Output 1.5 2.6 1.2 2.1 0.6
   Hours -1.0 1.1 0.3 0.8 1.8
   Output per Hour 2.5 1.5 0.9 1.3 -1.2
Source:  McGuckin-van Ark (2004, Table 1).  TABLE 3
            Labor Productivity by Industry Group, U. S. vs. Europe,
            1990-95 vs. 1995-2001, Annual Growth Rates in Percent
1990- 1995- 1990- 1990- 1995- 1990-
1995 2001 2001 1995 2001 2001
Total Economy 1.1 2.2 1.6 2.3 1.7 2.0
ICT Producing Industries 8.1 10.0 8.7 5.9 7.5 6.5
ICT Using Industries  1.2 4.7 2.9 2.0 1.9 1.9
  
Non-ICT Industries 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.8
 
  
Source:  O'Mahony and van Ark (2003, Table III.3).
United States European Union